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FAILING THE MOST VULNERABLE AMONG US
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Doe v. Darien Board of Education, the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut considered the admissibility of hearsay statements1 made by
plaintiff John Doe (John), a then twelve-year-old boy with Down syndrome.2 The
hearsay statements were offered to prove that 1) defendant Zachary Hasak (Hasak),
John’s paraprofessional aide at Tokeneke Elementary School, had sexually assaulted
him;3 and 2) defendants Darien Board of Education (BOE) and its employees had
notice of the sexual abuse and failed to take corrective action, making them
potentially liable for the alleged assault.4
During the course of litigation, the court barred John’s out-of-court statements that
he notified his school principal and school psychologist about the incident. The decision
to block this vital evidence from trial reinforced a dangerous precedent that effectively
discourages victims from bringing future claims before the court. This result reflects a
common theme among the legislative and judicial branches: Children with disabilities
are not credible, and consequently are not afforded equal protection under the law.5
“Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute” because,
in many cases, the only witnesses are the alleged assailant and the victim.6 When the
victims are children with disabilities, detecting child abuse becomes even more
difficult. Although studies have shown that children with disabilities are more likely
to be abused than their non-disabled peers, the abuse often goes unreported.7 Yet our
lawmakers and justice system continue to demonstrate an unwillingness to provide
special needs children with adequate legal safeguards to deter potential abusers,
depriving some victims of any redress.8
1.

Hearsay refers to any “statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).

2.

110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (D. Conn. 2015).

3.

Id. at 393, 395.

4.

Id. at 403.

5.

Cf. Frances Ellery et al., Out from the Shadows: Sexual Violence Against Children with
Disabilities 17–20 (2011), https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/4917/pdf/4917.pdf
(discussing the widespread discrimination against children with disabilities by legislative and judicial
institutions on a global scale).

6.

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).

7.

See UNICEF, Children and Young People with Disabilities: Fact Sheet 25–26 (2013), https://
www.unicef.org/disabilities/files/Factsheet_A5__Web_REVISED.pdf (noting that children with
disabilities are three to four times more likely to experience abuse, and that protection and reporting
mechanisms are often inadequate); see also Leigh Ann Davis, Abuse of Children with Intellectual Disability,
Arc, https://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3666 (last updated Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that despite
an increased likelihood of abuse, communication problems or an inability to discern inappropriate or
abusive conduct leave many cases of abuse against children with disabilities unreported).

8.

See UNICEF, supra note 7; see generally Nat’l Council on Disability, Broken Promises: The
Underfunding of IDEA 9 (2018), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_BrokenPromises_508.pdf
(highlighting the grossly inadequate funding of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
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This Note contends that the current landscape diminishes the possibility of
redress for children with disabilities who are victims of sexual abuse at school.9
Established precedent imposes a rigid standard for these victims to hold school
districts accountable for their employees’ conduct. Lower courts bound by precedent
fail to take this rigid standard into account when they block vital testimony from
being admitted at trial, and strict adherence to evidentiary rules in cases involving
vulnerable children with disabilities frustrates the ability of sexual abuse claims to
survive motions for summary judgment.
To remedy this outcome, this Note offers three potential solutions. First, the
Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to include a new exception to the rule
against hearsay statements, tailored to determine the sufficiency and admissibility of
statements made by children with disabilities. Alternatively, courts should interpret
and apply the existing hearsay exceptions in a way that affords children with
disabilities a voice rather than a muzzle. Finally, Congress should fully fund the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)10 so school districts have the
resources necessary to provide a proper education to children with disabilities in an
abuse-free environment.
II.	THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX AND THE RULE AGAINST
HEARSAY

When a student alleges that a teacher in their school district has sexually abused
them, they have a cause of action for damages under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).11 In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District held that a school district may only be liable for
sexual abuse of a student if a school district official with authority to take corrective
action possesses actual knowledge of the abuse.12 For recovery under this section, a
plaintiff must show not only that the abuse occurred, but also that school officials
were aware of the abuse and responded with “deliberate indifference to
discrimination.”13 Thus, the Court imputed a rigid standard into Title IX, ensuring

9.

This Note focuses exclusively on children with disabilities who have a documented difficulty
communicating effectively with others.

10.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2017).

11.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1998); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2015). Title IX provides in pertinent part that “no person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.

12.

524 U.S. at 277; see also Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (extending
liability under Title IX to cases of student-on-student sexual harassment).

13.

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see also Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 408 (D. Conn. 2015)
(“Deliberate indifference may be found both when the defendant’s response to known discrimination is
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances, and when remedial action only follows after a
lengthy and unjustified delay.”).
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the burden of proof lies heavily on the plaintiff.14 This high standard was set to
eliminate any “risk that the recipient [of federal funding] would be liable in damages
not for its own official decision, but for its employees’ independent actions.”15
However, what happens when a disabled student who is unable to communicate
effectively is sexually abused? How can the victim notify school officials of the harm?
Even if details of the abuse are properly conveyed, does the school district act with
deliberate indifference if it fails to take corrective action because it views the report
of abuse as a fabrication resulting from the child’s disability? What if the victim is
unable to testify in court due to their inability to communicate? How should courts
adduce evidence of actual knowledge and apply the deliberate indifference standard
to these scenarios? How can the trier of fact properly decide on a verdict when
evidence of a vital fact is unavailable?
Supreme Court precedent and the evidentiary rules place a nearly insurmountable
burden on children with disabilities attempting to recover damages for abuse suffered
at school. Children with disabilities often experience difficulties communicating
effectively,16 which can prevent a school official from taking a disabled child’s
allegation seriously.17 If the child cannot testify in court about statements they made
to a school official, their only other proof of notice might be hearsay evidence, which
is generally inadmissible.18 Importantly, if a court finds that none of the hearsay
exceptions apply, the evidence will be barred, increasing the likelihood that the
plaintiff will be unable to defeat a motion for summary judgment.19 But there are
exceptions to the rule against hearsay, the most relevant to this analysis being the
excited utterance and residual hearsay exceptions.20

14.

See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 642–43 (noting the “high standard” that Gebser
imposed to render school districts liable under Title IX).

15.

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91. The Court reasoned that permitting damages recovery against a school
district based on principles of respondeat superior would frustrate the purpose of Title IX. Id. at 283.

16.

Children with disabilities often suffer from receptive or expressive communication problems, including
speech delay or impairment and verbal apraxia (difficulty making muscle movements to speak clearly).
Understanding Language Disorders, Understood, https://www.understood.org/en/learning-attentionissues/child-learning-disabilities/communication-disorders/understanding-language-disorders (last
visited Jan. 16, 2019). These and other communication difficulties sometimes arise as a product of
Down syndrome or autism. See id.

17.

See, e.g., Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398 (“Defendants’ contention [is] that John’s account is unreliable
because he sometimes repeats things he has heard on television and because he has used inappropriate
language in the past . . . .”); see also Doe v. E. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 16-CV-6594 (CJS),
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76798, at *73–74 (W.D.N.Y. May 7, 2018) (dismissing a child’s discrimination
claim for failure to plead to the court’s satisfaction that she was sexually abused because of her disability).

18.

See Fed. R. Evid. 802 (stating that hearsay is not admissible unless provided by a federal statute, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, or by other rules prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court).

19.

See Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 395.

20. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2), 807.
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An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”21 Courts
consider several factors when analyzing testimony under the excited utterance
exception.22 These factors include: 1) the lapse of time between the startling event
and the out-of-court statement; 2) the age of the declarant; 3) the physical and
mental condition of the declarant; 4) the characteristics of the event; and 5) the
subject matter of the statements.23
Under the residual hearsay exception, a hearsay statement that is not covered
under any of the other recognized exceptions may be admissible if “(1) the statement
has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts;
and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of [the Federal Rules of Evidence]
and the interests of justice.”24
These exceptions would appear to provide an avenue for admitting hearsay
statements made by children with disabilities notwithstanding the rigid pleading
standard required by Title IX; however, this avenue is not foolproof. In Doe v.
Darien, the court refused to apply these exceptions to alleged statements that were
not “specific enough” to show that the school was notified of the abuse, hence failing
to create a genuine issue of material fact—a requirement for defeating a motion for
summary judgment.25 Thus, a narrow application of the hearsay exceptions allows
courts to block vital testimony from being entered into evidence.
III. THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPACT ON REDRESS

In Doe v. Darien, John Doe raised various claims against Hasak, his teacher, the
school psychologist, the school principal, and the BOE.26 The claims relied almost
entirely on evidence that John was sexually abused and that he provided the
defendants with notice of the alleged abuse. 27 The defendants filed a motion for
21.

Id. 803(2).

22.

Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 396–97 (citing United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85–86 (8th Cir.
1980)).

23.

Id.

24.

Fed. R. Evid. 807 (a)(1)–(4).

25.

110 F. Supp. 3d at 403.

26. This Note focuses primarily on the Title IX claim against the BOE. The suit against the BOE included

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a); and procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 393. The suit against Hasak alleged assault and battery and
reckless and wanton conduct. Id. All defendants (excluding the Town of Darien) were sued for general
negligence and for violating substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

27.

Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 395. On the issue of notice, John and his parents claimed John’s teacher, the
school psychologist, the school principal, and the assistant director of special education for Darien
elementary schools had notice of the allegations of sexual abuse. See id. at 403.
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summary judgment, arguing that all of the statements were inadmissible hearsay.28
Since there was uncertainty as to whether John would testify at trial, 29 much of these
statements would indeed have been inadmissible hearsay, consisting mostly of
testimony by John’s parents that John told them he had made school officials aware
of the alleged abuse, and a transcript of an interview conducted with John shortly
after the alleged incident.30 Because a party cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay when
opposing a motion for summary judgment, the court had to determine the likelihood
that the hearsay evidence would be admitted under a hearsay exception at trial.31
The court found that John’s out-of-court statements offered to prove the alleged
abuse would likely be admissible at trial under either the excited utterance or residual
hearsay exceptions.32 However, when determining the admissibility of that evidence
to show that the school district had notice, the court engaged in a more exacting
analysis of the hearsay exceptions. The court sided with the defendants, finding
John’s statements to his parents and the interview transcript to lack specificity in
timing and substance, such that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the school
had actual knowledge of the abuse.33 Thus, John’s statements alleging that he told his
school psychologist and his principal about the abuse were barred.34 At trial, a federal
jury found that Hasak was liable for damages for the allegations against him, but the
BOE was not liable because school officials did not have notice of the abuse.35
28. See id. at 393.
29. Id. at 395 n.3.
30. See id. at 401. The interview was conducted by a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART)—a team

charged with addressing the needs of sexual assault victims. Id. at 394; see Nat’l Sexual Violence
Res. Ctr., https://www.nsvrc.org/sarts/toolkit/1 (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). The interview was arranged
by the Stamford Child Guidance Center in conjunction with the Darien Police Department and the
Board of Education. Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 394.

31.

Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 395; see also Nyack v. S. Conn. State Univ., 424 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D. Conn.
2006) (“A party ‘cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay in opposing a motion for summary judgment . . .
absent a showing that admissible evidence will be available at trial.’”) (quoting Burlington Coat Factory
Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1985)).

32.

Darien, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398. The court determined that John’s young age, his mental disability, the
shocking nature of the alleged abuse, the spontaneity and unsolicited nature of his statements, and the
general timing of his statements all supported the conclusion that John’s descriptions of the abuse to his
parents and the SART interviewers were credible and likely to be admissible as excited utterances. Id. at
397–98. The court also determined that the consistency in John’s allegations provided sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness, making the evidence admissible under the residual hearsay exception. Id.
at 400–01.

33.

Id. at 403. John’s father stated that John “could not say exactly but intimated that it happened recently,
this week.” Id. at 397. John claimed during the interview that he told his teacher that “Hasak was trying
to kiss him or do something like that.” Id. at 403. Additionally, at a separate interview with school
officials to discuss the allegations, John claimed that he told the school psychologist of the abuse. Id.

34. Id. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part. Id. at 414.
35.

See Martin B. Cassidy, Former Darien School Aide Found Guilty of Sex Abuse, NewsTimes (Aug. 13,
2015), http://w w w.newstimes.com/news/article/Former-Darien-school-aide-found-guilty-ofsex-6441870.php.
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Doe v. Darien vividly showcases how the high evidentiary burden of the actual
notice standard can prevent children with disabilities from adequate recovery when
their school district fails to protect them from sexual abuse at school. Without a
video recording or other non-testimonial evidence to prove Title IX’s notice
requirement, a disabled child must testify in court to avoid the rule against hearsay.
This is undoubtedly problematic for children who are unable to communicate
effectively and are unable to testify due to trauma.36
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE LACK OF REDRESS

Scholars and international organizations advocating for children with disabilities
have recognized the challenges that disabled victims of abuse face when trying to
obtain relief. 37 Our judicial system fails to ensure justice for all when disabled
survivors of abuse and their families are unable to recover against school districts
that have failed to protect them.38 Instead, the heavy litigation burden shouldered by
plaintiffs allows school district officials to operate with the knowledge that legal
liability is unlikely.39 The solutions proposed below aim to ensure that children with
disabilities who experience sexual abuse at school have access to redress for the
sexually abusive crimes committed against them.
A. New Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay

The Federal Rules of Evidence should be revised to include a new hearsay
exception.40 For cases of sexual abuse, this exception would apply to statements made
by children with disabilities who have a documented communication difficulty.41
This new exception could either be introduced as a stand-alone exception to the rule

36. See generally Nat’l Child.’s Advocacy Ctr, Children’s Testimony—Issues and Concerns (2014),

https://www.nawj.org/uploads/pdf/conferences/2014/CLE/childrens_testimony_issues_and_concerns_
ncac.pdf; Barry Nurcombe, The Child as a Witness: Competency and Credibility, 25 J. Am. Acad. Child
Psychiatry 473, 475 (1986), https://www.jaacap.org/article/S0002-7138(10)60004-0/pdf.

37.

See UNICEF, supra note 7.

38. Cf. Ellery et al., supra note 5, at 17–19; see also Jesse Krohn, Sexual Harassment, Sexual Assault, and

Students with Special Needs: Crafting an Effective Response for Schools, 17 U. Penn. J.L. & Soc. Change
29, 33 (2014), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=jlasc.

39.

Cf. Ellery et al., supra note 5, at 17.

40. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court has the authority to modify the Federal Rules of

Evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2017). For example, in 2014, the Court added clarifying language to
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a declarant-witness’s prior statement hearsay exclusion. See Letter from John G.
Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives & Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frev14_3318.pdf.

41.

Sufficient proof that the child has difficulty communicating can be obtained by reviewing the child’s
medical files, clinical reports, and school records and evaluations.
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against hearsay, or act in conjunction with an existing exception, such as the excited
utterance or residual hearsay exception.42
Under this proposed exception, a court should consider the following factors: 1)
the declarant’s documented mental or behavioral disability;43 2) the declarant’s
documented communication skills;44 3) the subject matter of the statements offered
as evidence;45 4) whether the statements are offered to prove a material fact;46 and 5)
whether the declarant can corroborate the statements using reasonable efforts.47
When weighing these factors, courts should not consider the level of specificity of
the statements made at the summary judgment phase of litigation. These factors
should be considered together and weighed against the risk of undermining the
purpose of the hearsay rule, which is to encourage unwilling witnesses to testify and
ensure inaccuracies are exposed before the trier of fact.48 The end result will be a
lower hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome in defeating a motion for summary judgment,
allowing them to proceed to trial for a trier of fact to decide how much weight to
place on the statements made.
In Doe v. Darien, John had a documented medical diagnosis, and an individualized
education plan tailored to his cognitive and verbal needs.49 This new exception would
have helped ensure that evidence of the school officials’ knowledge was entered into
evidence; a trier of fact would then have had the ability to ascertain the credibility of
John’s statements and fairly determine whether the evidence was sufficient to hold
42.

Some states have recognized the need to amend evidentiary rules to meet the needs of disabled children.
For example, Mississippi’s high court expanded the state’s “tender years” exception to the rule against
hearsay to consider a child’s mental and emotional age when determining whether the exception applies.
See Veasley v. State, 735 So. 2d 432, 437 (Miss. 1999). Minnesota’s high court created a similar rule that
admits out-of-court statements made by children or the mentally impaired alleging an act of sexual
contact. See State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn. 1989) (listing the factors a court should
consider when determining the reliability of hearsay evidence); see also Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subdiv. 3
(2016) (allowing evidence of certain out-of-court statements made by children less than ten years old or
mentally impaired persons).

43.

In weighing this factor, courts should consider how severely the documented disability affects the
declarant’s communication abilities.

44. The degree to which a declarant’s speech and comprehension ability is impaired should inform how

much weight to place on this factor.

45.

For example, statements alleging abuse or neglect of which the declarant is a victim should enjoy a
presumption of admissibility due to the severity of the complaint.

46. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2). The more material the fact is to a claim or defense, the more weight the

court should place on this factor to tip the scale in favor of admissibility of the hearsay statement,
particularly in light of the fifth factor.

47.

Cf. id. 807(a)(3). For example, if the statement merely corroborates a fact that other admissible evidence
supports, then the statement may tip the court toward exclusion. Alternatively, if the statement provides
key evidence toward proving a material fact for which no other support exists, the court should consider
admitting the statement into evidence. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subdiv. 3(b)(ii) (allowing hearsay
evidence of a declarant child or mentally impaired person when “there is corroborative evidence of the
act”).

48. Fed. R. Evid. Art. VIII.
49. 110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (D. Conn. 2015).
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the school district liable. Most importantly, the court would not have continued a
practice of silencing children with disabilities due to their inability to effectively
communicate with others.
B. Broader Interpretation of Summary Judgment and Hearsay Rules

As an alternative to creating a new exception, this Note proposes that courts
should interpret existing summary judgment and hearsay rules more broadly. For
example, in Doe v. Darien, the court held that the hearsay exceptions were not
applicable to John’s statements that he gave school officials notice of his abuse because
his allegations were not specific enough.50 However, specificity is not a factor courts
should consider when analyzing the above hearsay exceptions.51 On the contrary, a
lack of specificity or recollection of an abusive incident could be attributed to both
the mental state of the declarant and the stress experienced by the victim.52 The
court’s narrow approach means that prevailing in a Title IX abuse claim against a
school district depends heavily on the disabled child’s capacity to communicate the
events regarding their abuse effectively. Instead, in a motion for summary judgment,
courts should view the alleged statements in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when determining its sufficiency as evidence.53
Thus, when a disabled child does not adequately relay specific details regarding
when or to whom they reported an alleged incident of sexual abuse, and they are
unlikely to testify at trial, courts should deem the alleged statements admissible if
any hearsay exceptions could plausibly apply. The burden of proof should then shift
to the moving party to prove the statements were not made, or that alternatively,
adequate corrective measures were taken. Otherwise, courts will continue to fail
children with disabilities by preventing their hearsay statements from being used to
hold school districts accountable.
C. Congress Should Fully Fund the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Lastly, Congress should fully fund the IDEA as a means of providing school
districts with the resources needed to prevent sexual abuse. The IDEA provides federal
funding for the education of children with disabilities, yet the federal government has
routinely failed to meet its funding obligation.54 Although the IDEA authorizes funding
50. Id. at 403.
51.

See, e.g., Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the lack of
specific details in a victim’s allegations of sexual abuse should not warrant the summary dismissal of her
claim, as “[t]he decision as to which witness’s version of the events should be credited is one to be made
by a fact finder at trial, not by the court”).

52.

See Melissa Hamilton, The Reliability of Assault Victims’ Immediate Accounts: Evidence from Trauma
Studies, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 269, 288 (2015).

53.

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014).

54. See Michael Griffith, Is the Federal Government Shortchanging Special Education Students?, Ed Note

(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.ecs.org/is-the-federal-government-short-changing-special-education-
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of forty percent of the average cost to educate children with disabilities,55 it does not
guarantee this money will be made available to school districts.56 Since the passage of
the IDEA in 1975, Congress has failed to meet even half of that commitment.57 The
cost of funding special education programs is consequently shifted to the states, causing
school districts—especially those in low-income areas—to cut critical services that
would otherwise be beneficial to their special education students.58
Funding less than one half of the IDEA obligation is a gross mockery of what
the IDEA claims to stand for—improving educational results for children with
disabilities by “providing appropriate special education and related services . . .
whenever appropriate.”59 Congress’s stated intent in passing the IDEA was to “ensure
that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected,”60 and that children with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public
education.61 But how meaningful can the benefit of an education program be if it is
substantially underfunded?
By allocating more funds to state and local school districts, Congress would meet
its obligations under the IDEA and fulfill the law’s stated goals.62 More funding for
school districts would mean better services for children with disabilities, more
qualified teachers and paraprofessionals, more resources to properly screen employees
who may pose a risk to the safety of students, and better training for existing
employees on how to manage allegations of sexual abuse.
V. CONCLUSION

The well-documented lack of redress for children with disabilities is a direct
result of the current standards being employed by the courts. The precedent allows
courts to discount the credibility of the most vulnerable among us: children with
students (stating that in order to meet its funding goal of forty percent, Congress “would have to provide
states and school districts with an additional $19.7 billion in IDEA funding annually”).
55.

Amanda Litvinov, Bipartisan IDEA Bill Seeks to Stop Shortchanging Special Needs Students, Nat’l Educ.
Ass’n (Feb. 4, 2015), http://educationvotes.nea.org/2015/02/04/bipartisan-bill-seeks-to-stop-short
changing-special-needs-students.

56. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 8, at 20.
57.

Id.

58. See Litvinov, supra note 55. In 2014, the federal cost shifted to states was $17.6 billion. Id.
59.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(D) (2017).

60. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
61.

Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

62. Congress’s stated intent behind the act:

Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes the right of
individuals to participate in or contribute to society. Improving educational results for
children with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
individuals with disabilities.

§ 1400(c)(1).
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special needs. This results in blocking vital testimony from being admitted at trial
without regard to the communication challenges a disabled child may have. By
tailoring hearsay exceptions for disabled children with impaired communication
skills—whether by adopting a new or amending an existing exception—or simply
applying a broad interpretation of the existing rules, courts can begin to provide this
vulnerable class with the equal protection under the law they so deserve. Regardless
of the evidentiary rules, Congress should fully fund the IDEA to provide school
districts with the necessary services and resources needed to prevent and identify
sexual abuse in their district.
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